SOC 3.0

Automate Investigations with AI

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# Presentation Overview

History of Machine Learning and GenAI at Trellix

Development of Trellix Wise

GenAl Auto-Investigations

Trellix Wise with EDR + Helix

Trellix Wise + SOAR



# **37 Year Heritage**





# How Trellix Uses Generative Al

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# Our pre-Al approach

- 1. Create thousands of connectors and parsers to normalize event data from anywhere.
- 2. Store all of the data on S3 and OpenSearch.
- 3. Analyze the data for anomalies with Amazon EMR and ML models.
- 4. Report findings back to the customer.



# Effective, but hard to scale

#### What Worked

Ingesting Data Analyzing and Matching Searching obscene data volumes

# What Didn't Didn't have time to investigate all findings





# Example Security Timeline

#### **Analytics timeline**



Abnormal AWS AMI usage, API key usage, key pairs generated Abnormal console, app, and directory logins Abnormal office suite, directory, and infrastructure commands



### How do we find time to investigate everything that is "weird?"



Detecting anomalies was not enough.

We needed to focus on the right signals.

We needed gen Al.



### Generative AI can ask key questions and understand answers



Human

#### Trellıx

### What it takes to make gen Al work

- 1. Initial findings to investigate
- 2. Sub-second data retrieval times for all answers
- 3. Pre-built investigations for generative AI to ask the right questions



# Find me the Top Ten Things I need to look at



# Example: Anomalous Console Login

#### **Analytic thesis:**



Based on recent investigations, the tell-tale sign that an account is compromised is a password reset followed by a login from a new country.

Therefore, if a user resets a password and logs in from somewhere atypical, that needs to be investigated.

#### **Real World:**



### Users travel, forget passwords, have executive assistants, etc.

This happens hundreds of times per day in large organizations.

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#### **Generative Al Solution:**

- 1. Get some answers to specific questions (human time saved):
- 2. Is this user currently traveling? (3m)
- 3. Were there failed attempts before the password reset? (1m)
- 4. Does the user have an executive assistant? (1m)
- 5. What level of access does this user have? (3m)
- 6. What did they do after they reset the password? (5m)

Generative AI performs **13 minutes** of work in under **45 seconds**.

### E How does GenAl actually interpret investigation results?

Based on the information provided, there are several signs of suspicious activity from IP 10.207.17.85 that warrant raising the alert level:

- The SIEM alert indicates a detected brute force attack correlated with successful logins from the same IP. This **alone is a serious security event**.
- The IP has **triggered other rules recently** including Trellix IPS rules, indicating ongoing malicious behavior.
- The IP has generated logs across various systems including firewalls, DNS, and Windows events, showing **broad suspicious activity**.

Given the brute force attack, other security events, and signs of compromise across multiple systems, **I would recommend raising the alert level for this event to High severity**. A brute force attack that results in a successful login is a critical security incident that requires priority investigation and response. The **supporting evidence** of other suspicious network activity from this IP makes the situation more severe.

# Trellix

# Real-world examples of GenAl auto-investigations

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# Investigate alert: TRELLIX ENDPOINT HX

#### [file write to named pipe (methodology)]

#### **GenAl ANALYSIS:**

Based on the information provided, there are a few factors to consider:

- The IOC detected relates to use of named pipes for command and control, which is inherently suspicious activity.
- The same IOC was triggered by 2 other hosts in the last 24 hours.
- The source IP has communicated with several external IPs, some of which **appear to be cloud hosting providers.**
- The source hostname and user are tied to other recent alerts, indicating repeated suspicious activity.
- The affected asset is the 'system' account, which has high privileges on the host.

While none of these are definitive signs of compromise on their own, together they paint a picture of potentially malicious activity that warrants further investigation. The source system and user should be examined more closely through additional logging and monitoring.

I would recommend raising the severity of this alert to High, to **escalate the response**. The clustering of related activity and criticality of the affected asset justify treating this with increased urgency. However, more conclusive evidence would likely be needed to declare this a verified incident. Continued monitoring and gathering of forensic data should be prioritized.

# Investigate alert: TRELLIX ENDPOINT HX

#### [fe\_trojan\_macro\_generic\_129]

#### **GenAl ANALYSIS:**

Based on the information provided, there are a few signs of suspicious activity that warrant raising the alert level:

- The Trellix HX alert indicates detection of a file write IOC on the affected asset. This is a potential sign of malware infection.
- The supporting rules show additional Trellix HX alerts for malware detection and IOCs on the same source IP. This strengthens the indication of potential compromise.
- There are intel hits related to this source IP for non-DNS FQDNs associated with malware. This is further corroboration.
- The affected asset triggered the same IOC detection for a Trojan macro. The repeated detection is concerning.
- The MD5 hash for this alert is **associated with other alerts for this asset and IP**. This indicates the malware is being spread.
- The user associated with **the asset is a demo user**, which can be more prone to compromise if credentials are shared.

Given the above, I would recommend raising the alert level to High severity. While a single IOC detection may only warrant a Medium alert, the repeated detections, intel hits, and signs of malware spread justify escalating the severity. Prompt investigation and containment actions should be prioritized for this alert.

## Never miss an alert



# Finally, there is enough help to get the job done.

Trellix scales Analysts with auto investigations

# 

#### Average customer scenario

Alerts Per day	1,100
Events Per Alert	65
Analyst time per event	5 Seconds

To analyze every alert, Bedrock performs **357,500** seconds of analyst time per day, which is about **12** 8-hour shifts.

Helix Connect allows Trellix Wise to be given specific instructions and guidance for its decision making.

#### This can be anything. Examples:

Always escalate endpoint alerts when the user has access to AWS. Only escalate alerts from endpoints belonging to sales on weekends. Be more suspicious of phishing emails near the end of the fiscal quarter.

# Evolve from data mining to alert mining



**Before** 

Analyst overwhelmed by alerts

Waste time tuning tools to reduce alerts

Only investigate alerts that are clear/obvious

Reduce alert aperture to known-bad

Ignore most alerts



After

Focus on top 1% without penalty

Turn on all available alert sources

Deep investigations on most valuable alerts

Spend time on innovation and threat hunting

No alerts ignored

# The Al arms race





# **Trellix Wise with EDR**

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# Trellix Wise with EDR

#### **Use Cases**

- Natural language query for Historical and Real Time Search
- Rightsized Security Posture Management
- Accelerated investigations and threat hunting
- Dossier Mode provides executive summaries of an incident
- Interactive Mode enables analysts to uncover new security insights
- Knowledge Graph visually shows the attack path



# Natural Language Search

#### Trellix Wise with EDR

≡ Trellıx	EDR	
Historical Search	Search with Wise 🗸 🥝 show me all events for 192.168.10.1 and for the endpoint named x-laptop	🔾 📋 Last 4 hours
	GENERATED QUERY IpAddress = "192.168.10.1" AND DeviceName = "x-laptop"	
	Use natural language to determine all the events pertaining to an endpoint, file, or process. For example, you can ask:	
	"show me all events for 192.168.10.1 and for the endpoint named x-laptop"	



### Analyze Detection – Affected Assets

Quickly view assets generating alerts and their status – Not Contained, Pending, Contained

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### Analyze Detection – Suggested Actions

Quickly view GenAI-suggested actions to be performed based on alert generated and asset type



## Trellix Detection – Modes

Easily switch between Dossier mode for executive summaries and Interactive mode to unearth new insights through guided threat hunting

Trellix   EDR → Monitoring								G	#
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Threat-Sample.exe May 28, 2 1:47:15 AM	9644BB97D54325CD4	3E93FE10CB95146	powershell.exe			ode-ii			



### Analyze Detection – Dossier Mode

Dossier mode provides executive summaries of an incident that details what happened, where it happened, when it happened, and whose credentials were involved.

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### Analyze Detection – Interactive Mode

Interactive mode enables the unearthing of new insights and their MITRE mappings through guided threat hunting by helping analysts answer questions of

When did the incident happen?

What do I do with this information?

What actions can I take?

Trellix

Where can I get more information?

Trellix   EDR → Monitoring								ଓ ∷ା (→	
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							Generate a Knowledge Graph S	uggest some Recommended Actions	

## Analyze Detection – Knowledge Graph

Knowledge Graph provides a visual representation of the anatomy of an attack



# Trellix

# **Trellix Wise with SOAR**

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# SOAR + GEN AI =

#### Example Use Cases

#### Summarization of an incident

AI can sift through diverse data sources, including logs, alerts, and threat intelligence, to extract meaningful
insights

#### Recommendations for remediation

 By analyzing the characteristics and similarities between current and previously resolved incidents, AI can suggest appropriate remediation steps based on proven best practices

#### Recommendations for protections

 Based on this analysis, AI can offer recommendations for enhancing defenses, such as implementing intrusion detection and prevention systems, tightening access controls, updating security policies, or conducting security awareness training

#### Multilingual support

 Al's language processing capabilities enable SOAR platforms to support multiple languages, overcoming language barriers in incident response

# Playbook - Event Analysis with GenAl

Trellix Automated Response pulls that latest event from Trellix Network Security



# Playbook - Event Analysis with GenAl

Trellix Automated Response initiates a playbook to call to AWS Sagemaker and pass over the event information to get a summarization, remediation steps, recommended protections



# Playbook - Event Analysis with GenAl

Trellix Automated Response uses the results from AWS Sagemaker to create a ServiceNow ticket with the output and assign the ticket to the local network team



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6. Disable macros in Microsoft Office.	5. Enable user account co	ntrol (UAC).	
7. Regularly back up data.			
<ol> <li>Disable the AutoRun feature.</li> </ol>	6. Disable macros in Micro	osoft Office.	
9. Use a whitelisting solution to block unknown programs.			
10. Educate users on the risks of ransomware.	7. Regularly back up data		
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1. Install and regularly update antivirus software.	of Disable the Mitokuli 18		
<ol><li>Install the latest security patches and updates.</li></ol>			
3. Enable the built-in firewall.	9. Use a Whitelisting sol	ution to block unknown programs.	
4. Disable Remote Login if not needed.			
5. Enable FileVault disk encryption.	10. Educate users on the	risks of ransomware.	
6. Regularly back up data.			
7. Disable the AutoRun feature.			
8. Use a whitelisting solution to block unknown programs.			
9. Educate users on the risks of ransomware.			
Linux			



# Trelix